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Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the European Court of 
Justice: Legal Frameworks for Denationalized Governance Structures
C hristia n  Jo e r g e s* ' **
1. An Analytical Framework
The European Court of Justice ‘cannot shy away from technical questions’. This 
observation of Advocate General Walter van Gerven in his opinion in the TU 
Miinchen case* 1 is certainly valid. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
indeed in many contexts been forced to take a stand on issues involving the 
legal assessment of non-legal evidence in general2, and scientific expertise in 
particular.3 It is one thing, however, to acknowledge that the ECJ’s involvement 
in such issues has proved to be unavoidable and quite another to assess its 
performance in dealing with that challenge. The involvement of courts and 
administrative bodies poses multi-faceted problems. To these the European 
legal system adds further genuine difficulties stemming from its specific 
institutional features and the constraints they imply. It is, of course, possible 
and instructive to contrast the performance of the European legal system with
* Part-time Professor of Law, European University Institute, Florence; Co-Director, Centre 
for European Legal Policy, Bremen.
** An elaborated version of this paper will be published in: Joerges, Ch./ Ladeur, K.-H. in 
collaboration with E. Vos (eds.), Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory Decision- 
Making -National Experiences and European Innovations, Nomos (forthcoming).
1 Case C-269/90 Hauptzollamt Munchen-Mitte v Technische Universitat Miinchen [1991] 
ECR 1-5469 at 5483.
2 Ellen Vos’s celex research for a few keywords (‘scientific committees’; ‘scientific’; 
‘technical’; ‘risk and health’; ‘risk and safety’) has brought to light more than 60 cases which 
were directly in point.
3 It is common to differentiate between these two categories of knowledge (see e.g. 
Claudio M Radaelli, ‘The Role of Knowledge in the Policy Process’ Journal o f  European 
Public Policy 2 (1995), 159-183), although resort to non-scientific expertise such as economic 
analyses as used in so many fields of economic regulation, poses similar problems; 
furthermore, an insulation of scientifically based decision-making criteria from other policy 
concerns such as the economic consequences of standard-setting in the field of social 
regulation here under consideration, is to be understood as a deliberate choice which 
presupposes a specific institutional setting and needs to be based on an adequate design of 




























































































international debates on the legal regulation of scientifically controversial 
issues, or to compare the attitudes of national courts or administrative bodies 
and their experiences with traditional and modem regulatory approaches.4 But 
any such comparison will have to carefully reflect upon its own yardsticks.5
References to expertise occur in many fields and angles of modem legal 
systems; the categories of knowledge required vary, as does the intensity of its 
impact on decision-making. The Community system, however, is not 
comprehensive in two important respects. Its own need for expertise typically 
arises in the context of European regulatory activities, i.e. in the field of 
economic regulation and competition policy on the one hand and in the various 
areas of social regulation on the other. It is in this latter field of social 
regulation that resort to ‘scientific expertise’ plays a highly prominent role. 
Outside the field of agricultural policy, where the protection of health and 
consumers has always been treated as an integral element of ‘market’-building6, 
the intense involvement of the Community in social regulation has taken place 
in conjunction with its efforts to complete and to manage the Internal Market. 
As a result of these linkages with primarily economic objectives, the European 
system must implement its social regulation at a complex crossroads of often 
merely functional Community and residual Member State competencies. 
Equally important, the Community remains dependent upon the cooperation of 
national courts, administrative bodies and non-governmental actors in the 
implementation of its policies. Last but not least, judicial review at the 
European level is usually prompted by preliminary proceedings under Article 
177, which do not however foresee a comprehensive or definite resolution of 
the regulatory issues concerned.
This background to the jurisprudence of the ECJ will not be addressed 
comprehensively in this paper nor will it be traced through a detailed
4 Cf. Rolf Rausch, Die Kontrolle von Tatsachenfeststellungen und-wiirdigungen durch den 
Gerichtshof der europaischen Gemeinschaften. Zu gerichtlichen Nachpriifung von 
Kommissionsentscheidungen im Vergleich zum deutschen und franzdsischen Recht (Duncker 
& Humblot, 1994); Schlacke, S., Die europaische Regulierung der Sicherheit von 
Zusatzstoffen, Typescript (Centre for European legal Policy, Bremen 1995); on machinery 
safety cf. Biicker, A., Die rechtliche Regulierung der Sicherheit von Maschinen unter dem 
Einflufi der europaischen Rechtsangleichung - Von der Gefahrenabwehr zur Risikovorsorge, 
PhD. Thesis (Bremen, 1996).
5 Cf. generally Dehousse, R., ‘Comparing National and EC Law: The Problem of the Level 
of Analysis’, (1994) 42 American Journal o f  Comparative Law 761.




























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
description of legislative developments. It will rather be presented, first, by a 
general observation on the attractiveness of scientifically endorsed decision­
making criteria for the European legal system; second, by an outline of 
regulatory patterns that have emerged in the Europeanized fields of social 
regulation; and third, by a hypothesis concerning the constitutional importance 
of these developments and the challenges they present to the ECJ. These 
observations and assumptions will then serve as guide through the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence. Because of its dependence on partly trans-legal and non­
positivist premises, it goes without saying that this kind of interpretation cannot 
claim any definite or exclusive validity. But it is submitted that any meaningful 
interpretation of the ECJ’s case-law needs to resort to the kind of framework 
employed here. It is only through its refinement and improvement that one can 
(and should!) search for an interpretation of greater explanatory strength and 
more thorough normative plausibility.
1.1. The Territorial Boundaries of Legal Systems and the Trans-legal 
Status of Scientific Knowledge
The resort of legal systems to scientific expertise is inextricably linked with 
modem technological developments and the social responses they provoke. 
Along with improvements in scientific knowledge which enable us to detect the 
sources of ‘dangers’, to identify the likely implications of activities, and thus to 
transform ‘dangers’ into ‘risks’7 legal systems have come under pressure to 
integrate this knowledge and to devise regulatory schemes which allow for its 
use. This story need not be retold here.8 But there is one aspect of particular 
importance in the Community context which should be stressed.
Recourse to scientific expertise in regulatory decision-making gains 
authoritative validity only through its attribution to some specific legal system 
which endorses the bindingness of scientific findings, ensures the enforcement 
of expert assessments, and takes responsibility for prohibiting activities and/or 
accepting risks. The reach of legal systems, be they nationally or 
supranationally organized, remains limited to their territorial boundaries. From 
the viewpoint of the scientific community, this segmentation seems contrary to
7 Cf. N. Luhmann, Soziologie des Risikos, Berlin-NewYork: de Gruyter, 1991, 9 ff.
8 See more generally W. Kock, ‘Die rechtliche Bewâltigung technischer Risiken’, 





























































































the standards of science -  there is no such thing as German physics or European 
mathematics. To be sure, cultural and political traditions have shaped the 
practices of engineering, for instance, or the schools of thought in medicine and 
other disciplines. It is equally true that one has to differentiate between the 
scientific level of risk analysis and the practices of risk management which 
involve political and policy questions such as the acceptability of risks and 
regulatory responses to them.9 And yet, the standards of science as well as the 
techniques of risk assessment claim universal validity. Where scientists cannot 
agree, they nonetheless continue to interpret their controversies as a scientific 
exercise and entrust the scientific community with the competence to assess 
their claims. The integration of scientific expertise into legal systems may 
therefore be seen as a paradox. By resorting to scientific expertise, legal 
systems subject themselves to ‘external’ validity criteria. By the same token, 
through a reliance on scientific assessments, they overcome their built-in 
parochialism; the legal system becomes entitled to a recognition of its position 
beyond its own borders.
These interfaces between science-based evaluations and legal decision­
making lend themselves to prudent and strategic exploitation in the Community 
context. On the one hand, Community law may, wherever it manages to 
promote science-based standards of validity, ensure its own authority without 
the usual entanglements in complex controversies over competencies, 
conflicting economic interests and highly sensitive issues of political 
accountability. Member States, on the other hand, when pointing to scientific 
expertise as providing support for their regulatory concerns, can hardly be 
accused of promoting one-sidedly some parochial or projectionist interest.
1.2. ‘Negative Integration’, the Europeanization of Social Regulation and 
the Emergence of Regulatory Networks
The resort to science cannot occur in a legal vacuum. It presupposes legal 
provisions and regulatory frameworks to facilitate the recourse to expertise and 
expert assessments. The Community has thus had to devise and build up an 
adequate environment in order to exploit the integrating functions of scientific 
expertise.
9 Cf. Gouldner, A.W., ‘Cosmopolitans and Locals: Towards an Analysis of Latent Social 




























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
Article 30 EC, as interpreted by the ECJ, has been the main source of 
inspiration in primary law. This provision is to be read in conjunction with 
Article 36 EC and the explicit recognition of enumerated regulatory concerns 
therein. The Court’s jurisprudence on Article 30 EC has been praised and 
criticized for its ‘deregulatory’ implications. A closer look, however, reveals 
that these observations are inadequate in that they fail to substantiate the criteria 
on which the ECJ based its controls. What the Court did was to impose 
standards of regulatory reasonableness on Member States, albeit in a way which 
severely restricts regulatory discretion and forces Member States to provide 
scientific bases for protective policies they wish to pursue.10
Because of these in-built limitations of control over regulatory policies 
that can be exercised under Article 30, this provision has proven to be a far 
from perfect tool for overcoming barriers to trade. In order to realize its 
objective of completing the Internal Market, the Community was bound to 
pursue a strategy which delegitimized national regulatory policies, while at the 
same time ensuring that ‘reasonable’ regulatory concerns were taken care of 
within sophisticated European regulatory frameworks. Product regulation 
provides the most telling example.11 The Community never tried to simply 
guarantee the free circulation of goods. It also sought to ensure their 
acceptability -  and was therefore forced to replace not only mandatory national 
legislation but even non-mandatory product standards. It did so by promoting 
innovative regulatory schemes at European level, which have now reached the 
point of almost comprehensively covering the whole range of technical goods 
and other products.
The market rationale for reregulation at European level does not apply to 
‘process regulation’. The interest configurations in pertinent fields seem to 
render it unlikely that economically less advanced Member States might accept 
costly regulatory standards which would deprive them of their competitive 
advantages towards jurisdictions with stricter standards.12 The analytical 
distinction between product- and process-oriented regulation is, however, 
proves to be less clear-cut if one considers the outcome of European policies.
10 Cf. infra 2.1.
11 Cf. Ch. Joerges, ‘Paradoxes of deregulatory strategies at Community level: The example 
of Product Safety Policy’, in: G. Majone (ed.), Deregulation or reregulation?: Regulatory 
reform in Europe and in the United States, London: Pinter - New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1990, 176-197.
12 Cf. for an elaboration of this argument F.W. Scharpf Negative and Positive Integration 






























































































As the Community’s safety at work legislation in particular demonstrates, the 
‘technical’ and ‘political’ interdependence of product and process regulation 
can be such that they are dealt with as one sole package. Even in areas of 
environmental legislation which clearly have no impact on the quality of 
products, the European policy process has not resulted in a ‘race to the bottom’. 
In the case of air quality regulation, Héritier and her collaborators13 have 
detected a theoretically unpredicted form of ‘regulatory competition’; namely, 
efforts on the part of the most important Member States to impose their own 
regulatory approaches on the whole of the Community. Their political moves 
have been motivated by economic advantages stemming from such regulatory 
victories, but have not been directed towards environmental deregulation.
The processes of reregulating Europe have taken place despite the well- 
known constraints under which the Community’s system is to operate. The 
Community does not dispose of the coercive power that the modem State once 
monopolized. Adoption of legislative acts still depends upon the consent of at 
least a qualified majority of the Member States. Compliance with regulations 
and even the rulings of the ECJ depends upon the obedience of national 
institutions. Most noteworthy in our present context are the scarcity of 
administrative resources and the lack of genuine administrative powers. These 
constraints have influenced both the design of European regulatory techniques 
and the strategies of implementation14:
-  At all stages of the process of planning new initiatives and in the 
implementation of Community policies, the Commission ensures the 
cooperation of national actors.
-  Increasingly, the Community encourages and requests not only mutual 
recognition of decisions taken by national bodies but a continuous 
cooperation among national administrations. This includes the assignment of
13 A. Héritier, S. Mingers, Ch. Knill, M. Becka, Die Veranderung von Staatlichkeit in 
Europa. Ein regulativer Wettbewerb: Deutschland, Grofibritannien, Frankreich, Opladen: 
Leske & Budrich 1994.
14 Cf. more extensively Ch. Joerges, ‘Rationalisierungsprozesse im Recht der 
Produktsicherheit: Ôffentliches Recht und Haftungsrecht unter dem EinfluC der Europaischen 
Integration’, [1994] 27 Jahrbuch des Umwelt- und Technikrechts 141; idem, Die Beurteilung 
der Sicherheit technischer Konsumgiiter und der Gesundheit von Lebensmitteln in der Praxis 




























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
specific tasks, and thus amounts to a division of labour among Member 
States.
-  When preparing decisions on the acceptable level of risk and during the 
whole process of implementation, the Community establishes scientific 
committees or otherwise guarantees scientific advice; when concretizing the 
essential safety requirements of directives adopted under the New Approach 
to Technical Harmonization and Standards, the Commission relies on the 
expertise of European standardization organizations.
1.3. Denationalized Governance Structures and the European Legitimacy 
Problem
Interest formation and decision-making in the kinds of networks described 
above fit neither into the institutional structures foreseen within national 
constitutional States nor into those of the European Community. It seems 
equally impossible to explain the emergence and the functioning of these 
networks within the neo-functionalist or intergovemmentalist paradigms of 
integration research. They may be most adequately conceptualized as multi­
level games with a strong interdependence of national and supranational 
institutions, as well as national and transnational non-governmental actors.15 
Positive characterizations in legal terms are extremely difficult because they 
cannot build upon any elaborated model of political governance and legal 
institutions. Lawyers do, of course, observe all the elements of Europeanized 
regulatory networks, the continuous presence of Commission officials and 
representatives of national governments, the involvement of national and 
supranational non-governmental organisations in the processes of policy 
formation and implementation, the dependence of Community law on its 
support by national administrative bodies, and the compliance of courts. It is 
equally apparent that decision-making within European networks is not
15 Cf. F.W. Scharpf, ‘Community and autonomy: multi-level policy-making in the 
European Union’, Journal o f European Public Policy 1 (1994), 219-242; E. Grande, 
‘Forschungspolitik und die EinfluBlogik europaischer Politikverflechtung’. Beitrag fur den 
Arbeitskreis ‘Europaische Integration’ des 19. DVPW-Kongresses, Potsdam, 25-28 August 
1995. For recent general accounts cf. S. Hix, Approaches to the Study of the European 
Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics, (1994) 17 West European Politics, 1-24; 






























































































restricted to purely technical issues, but regularly affects economic interests and 
often normatively and politically sensitive concerns. Because of these 
implications, the ‘functioning’ of regulatory networks will in the last resort be 
dependent upon their legitimacy.
This delicate category cannot be neglected. But for the reasons just 
outlined, it seems futile to address it directly on the basis of some abstract 
preconceived normative model of social regulation in Europe. It seems equally 
unlikely that legislators and courts will come up with perfect and 
comprehensive solutions. What one is entitled to expect, however, is a 
sensitivity in principle, especially on the part of the ECJ, for the legitimacy of 
its rulings, which can be interpreted as a background agenda of the specific 
issues and contexts the Court is to address.
2. The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice
If international governance structures for social regulation are to emerge, 
scientific expertise can be expected to fulfil a prominent role in processing 
information and delivering commonly acceptable criteria for the assessment of 
risks. If one must attribute practical importance to these new governance 
structures, the acceptance of their decisional output by both the Community and 
the Member States must be ascertainable. The problem with this contention is, 
however, that it can only be validated indirectly. The search for denationalized 
legal structures must therefore take some detours. The following review of the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ will first turn to European primary law, which at first 
sight is only concerned with the imposition of restraints on unilateral national 
legislation. It will then examine controversies over regulatory competencies and 
inter-institutional conflicts. The primary focus of these analyses will be the 
resort to scientific expertise as a means to overcome the territorial boundaries of 
legal systems. Special attention will be paid, however, to the limits of such a 
strategy, which can be attributed either to the normative sensitivity of the ECJ 
or to its awareness of the practical need to supplement the validation of science- 
based decision-making with transnational frameworks for risk management 
(infra 2.1. and 2.2.). This more indirect confirmation of the ECJ’s readiness to 
accept and to promote denationalized governance structures will be followed by 
an examination of those judgments which have more directly addressed the 
legal issues of European social regulation. These cases are few in number and 
their review will demonstrate that the law of denationalized governance is still 
at an infant stage. But it will become apparent that the ECJ has, despite its 




























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
pronounce principles and rules which provide some guidance for future 
developments.
2.1. Regulatory Competencies and Scientific Expertise
Among the constitutional issues to be confronted in the Europeanization of 
social regulation, controversies over the Community’s competencies can be 
expected to play, and indeed have played, a prominent role. ‘Social regulation’ 
is a type of policy that the original Treaty on the European Economic 
Community had not foreseen. Its prominence at Community level is a 
consequence of the market-building efforts which have ranked high on the 
European agenda since 1985 and the adoption of the Single European Act. It 
was this policy that prompted reregulatory activities especially in the field of 
product, safety-at-work and environmental legislation and that led to the 
emergence of European regulatory networks.16 Precisely because the adoption 
and implementation of the new regulatory policies have occurred very much as 
an unpredicted discovery process, constitutional issues only gradually became 
apparent and have been left unresolved or even unexplored in many respects. 
This somewhat complacent attitude seems to a certain degree understandable. 
Insistence on the elaboration and clarification of constitutional issues prior to 
the adoption of new policies can have quite destructive implications when it 
leads to the conclusion that a socially desirable activity cannot be pursued for 
want of pertinent constitutional mandates.
The many-faceted delineation of Community and Member State 
competencies serves well to illustrate these general observations. Prior to the 
shift to majority voting in 1987, the Community objective of achieving a 
Common Market was restricted substantively by the explicit recognition of 
residuary national competencies in Article 36 and institutionally by the 
unanimity requirement for Community directives replacing national legislation. 
The consent of Member States to Community measures reduced the likelihood 
of controversies over the scope of ‘functional’ competencies derived from 
Article 100. That situation changed with majority voting and the Community’s 
mandate to pursue a ‘high level’ of health, safety, environmental and consumer 
protection.
16 Cf. supra 1.2. and more extensively Ch. Joerges, ‘Markt ohne Staat?, Die 
Wirtschaftsverfassung der Gemeinschaft und die Regulative Politik’, in R. Wildenmann (ed.), 
Staatswerdung Europas. Optionen fur eine Europaische Union, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1991, 





























































































2.1.1. Article 30 and the Disciplining o f the Member States
The most obvious example demonstrating how scientific universalism can be 
used to overcome the particularism of legal systems is offered by the extremely 
rich jurisprudence on Articles 30 and 36. This potential emerged from the well- 
known structuring of the meaning of these provisions by the ECJ. According to 
the famous holding in Dassonville, the prohibition by Article 30 of measures 
having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions covers ‘all trading rules 
enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade’.17 This broad 
interpretation of the notion of equivalent effect leaves Article 36 unaffected. 
However, the regulatory objective which this Article exempts from the principle 
enshrined in Article 30, made the Dassonville formula a potential threat, 
especially to areas such as consumer and environmental protection. In its 
famous Cassis de Dijon decision, the ECJ found a way to uphold the potential 
for supervision of Member States opened up by Dassonville while at the same 
time tempering the anxieties of Member States about the Community’s 
incursion into their regulatory concerns. The Court explained that essential 
public interests related, for example, to the protection of public health, 
consumer protection and environmental policy18 were not to be qualified as 
measures of equivalent effect.19
The many subtleties of the Court’s jurisprudence -  the changing scope of 
its supervision of Member States20, its deregulatory effects and their impact on 
the protection of consumers, the instrumentalization of Article 30 as a means to 
promote Community legislation -  need concern us here only in two respects. 
First, to what degree did the Court substitute legal criteria with scientific 
assessments, thereby overcoming the territorial boundaries of legal 
competencies? And second, in so far as the Member States were required to 
respect scientific expertise, how did the ECJ determine and delineate the 
validity of scientific assessments?
2.1.2. The Imposition o f  Science-based Criteria on National Legislatures
Cassis de Dijon has become famous for promoting a principle that the ECJ did 
not endorse; namely, the duty of Member States to open up their borders to
17 Case 8/78 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.
18 Case 303/86 Commission v Denmark [1988] ECR 4607 (Danish Bottle case).
19 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649.
20 Cf. Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR 1-6126; and now 




























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
products lawfully marketed elsewhere in the Community.21 The message of the 
Dassonville / Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence was more modest, but nonetheless 
daring. The ECJ’s distinction between legitimate and illegitimate regulatory 
concerns imposed a conceptual framework on the Member States within which 
they had substantiate their regulatory interests. Furthermore, and even more 
importantly, the ECJ requested Member States to take only such action which is 
‘proportionate to the aim in view’.22 In order to become an effective supervisory 
tool, the principle of proportionality needed to be concretised further. At that 
point, science came into view. This occurred with three variations, with 
foodstuffs law providing the most elaborated example.
Member States must not only state their views as to the risks for public 
health, but ‘the risk must be measured, not according to the yardstick of general 
conjecture but on the bases of relevant scientific research’.23 This is by no 
means a trivial requirement. It restricts legislative discretion and imposes 
standards on decision-making processes within the Member States. Once it had 
been established that legislation must be backed by relevant scientific evidence, 
it became unavoidable to decide upon the properties of such evidence. This 
delicate issue came up again and again when importers of foodstuffs, in 
response to being summoned by national authorities because of a violation of 
domestic law, invoked the Cassis de Dijon principle. When assessing the 
validity of national legislation, the Court asked Member States to respect ‘the 
findings of international scientific research, and in particular of the work of the 
Community’s Scientific Committee for Food24, the Codex Alimentarius 
Committee of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO)’.25
21 Cf. notably the Communication from the Commission concerning the consequences o f  
the judgment given by the Court o f  Justice on 20 February 1979 in case 120/78 (‘Cassis de 
Dijon’), OJ 1980 C 256, 2.
22 The principle of proportionality is an import into Community law from German 
constitutional law (cf. Zuleeg, M , ‘Deutsches und europâisches Verwaltungsrecht - 
Wechselseitige Einwirkungen’ (1994) 53 Veroffentlichungen der Vereinigung Deutscher 
Staatrechtslehrer 153-201 at 171-172 with further references). The principle has been cited as 
‘underlying the last sentence of Article 36 since Case 174/82 Sandoz [1983] ECR 2463; Case 
247/84 Motte [1985] ECR 3887, and Case 174/82 Muller [1986] ECR 1511.
23 Cf. as a recent example Case 17/93 Van der Veldt [1994] ECR 1-3537 at 3560 .
24 Cf. as to its tasks and composition, the pertinent Commission decisions in OJ 1974 L 
136, 1 and OJ 1986 L 163,40.




























































































The authority attributed to the international and European expert 
community need not be unconditional. In a judgment concerning residues in 
foodstuffs26, the ECJ introduced the concept of ‘per se' dangerous substances. 
The prohibition of such substances does not require the establishment of a 
‘danger’, but may form a more general policy designed to prevent their 
presence.27 ‘The authorities of the importing Member State are, however, 
obliged to review the prescribed maximum level if it appears to them (!) that the 
reasons which led to its establishment have changed, for example, as a result of 
the discovery of a new use for such and such a pesticide.’28
A second retraction concerns objective differences among the Member 
States such as ‘climatic conditions, the normal diet of the population and their 
state of health’.29 The most prominent example is provided by the beer case, 
where Germany, in defence of its Reinheitsgebot, argued that it was particularly 
desirable to prohibit the use of any additive in the manufacture of this product 
because ‘more beer is consumed by Germans than any other foodstuff.30 This 
argument was not taken seriously by the ECJ.31 32It has, however, been accepted 
in a series of other decisions, such as Melkunie.22 There the Court approved the 
Dutch Melkbesluit, prohibiting micro-organisms beyond a threshold number in 
pasteurized milk in view of the Dutch habit of keeping ‘such products for a 
period of time in less suitable conditions than those in the distributor’s plant’.33 
Giving in to the national conditions argument implies a partitioning of the 
Internal Market. It should be noted that the Court supported this concession by 
pointing to a broad acceptance of the Dutch standards on daily intake both in
26 Case 94/83 Albert Heijn BV [1984] 3263.
27 Case 94/83 at 3279-80.
28 Case 94/83 at 3280.
29 Case 94/83 at 3280.
30 Case 178/84 Reinheitsgebot [1987] ECR 1227, report for the hearing at 1236.
31 Cf. infra 2.1.4. for one o f the Court’s reasons, namely the lack of consistency in 
Germany’s legislation. The Court also referred to the requirement also repeated the argument 
of Case 304/84 Muller [1986] ECR 1511 that Member States are to provide a procedure for 
traders to apply for the authorization of additives contained in foreign products but prohibited 
in the importing state, cf. infra 2.1.4. In my reading, the Court’s reasoning reflects its own 
uncertainty about Germany’s insistence on the degree of uncertainty in the assessment of the 
risks involved; cf. p. 1274 and the opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn at 1257- 
1260.
32 Case 97/83 Melkunie [1984] ECR 2367.




























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
other Member States and outside the Community.34 35The Melkunie judgment can 
therefore be read as giving priority to a high level of protection not adopted by 
the Community, but reflecting a broadly accepted tendency.
2.1.3. Scientific Uncertainties
Both the distinction between ordinary and per se dangerous substances in the 
Albert Heijn case and the consideration of local conditions in the Melkunie 
judgment overlap with a second differentiation of fundamental importance.35 
As the Court has consistently held since Eyssen Nisin36, Member States cannot 
be reproached for discriminating arbitrarily or disguisedly restricting trade 
between Member States within the meaning of Article 36 when protective 
measures seem reasonable in view of ‘difficulties and uncertainties’ of risk 
assessments equally encountered by other countries or international 
organizations. As this reasoning indicates, the existence of uncertainties by no 
means entitles Member States to adopt whatever policy they may feel to be 
appropriate. Although the Court has repeatedly stated that, in the absence of 
harmonization, it is up to the Member States to decide how to react to 
‘uncertainties at the present stage of research’37, its reasoning in all pertinent 
cases38 is concerned with restrictions of the competencies of Member States to 
autonomously decide upon their regulatory policies. Where they are in principle 
entitled to require the explicit approval of plant production products, they must 
not ‘unnecessarily require technical or chemical or laboratory tests when the 
same analyses have already been carried out in another Member State and their 
results are available to those authorities or may at their request be placed at 
their disposal’.39 They are entitled to request the authorization of additives to 
foodstuffs, the more so since limiting the use of additives is ‘in accordance with 
a joint approach adopted by the Member States’.40 They are not required when
34 Cf. the opinion of Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat at 2395.
35 On the following cf. the comprehensive analysis of S. Schlacke, ‘Das Vorsorgeprinzip in 
der Rechtsprechung des EuGH - Eine Analyse am Beispiel der Rechtsprechung zur 
Warenverkehrsfreiheit von Lebensmitteln’, Europaische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 1996 
(forthcoming).
36 Case 53/80 Eyssen Nisin [1981] 409 at 422f.
37 See, for instance, case 174/82 Sandoz BV  [1983] 2445 para. 16 citing as a precedent 
Case 277/80 Biologische Producten [1981] ECR 3277, although the formula is not to be 
found there.
38 Including Case 304/84 Claude Muller [1986] ECR 1511 although the references to the 
international scientific community in that case are quite unspecific (cf. especially at 1529).
39 Case 272/80 Biologische Producten [1981] ECR 3277 at 3292.





























































































deciding upon authorisation to attribute binding force to the opinions of the 
Community’s Scientific Committee. But they must refer an importer’s 
application ‘to a committee of experts in order to obtain an opinion on the 
harmfulness of the additive, the degree of the human organism’s tolerance of it 
and the necessity, value and suitability of its use’.41 If it is then established by 
the authorities of the importing Member State that there is a ‘real need’ for that 
additive, ‘they may not (...) refuse authorisation solely on the ground that it is 
contained in the imported foodstuff.42
2.1.4. Legislative Coherence
One facet of the Court’s interpretation of the proportionality principle deserves 
particular mention. As the Court has consistently held, national regulations 
must be ‘appropriate’ to meet the legislature’s ends. This ends-means rationality 
is a well-defined concept in political sociology. Its plausibility as a yardstick for 
the functioning of legal systems seems, however, highly questionable. Two 
cases may serve to illustrate this point.
In its decision on the compatibility with Article 30 of a French 
requirement for the construction of woodworking machines43, the Court 
explained that France must only prescribe a specific level of protection but must 
not impede the importation of products solely on the ground that they are 
manufactured using an alternative technique.44 The Court added that the safety 
design of machines is to be seen as an element of a regulatory ‘concept’, which 
may give priority either to the construction or to the training of workers using 
machines. It then left France with the freedom to pursue its own safety 
philosophy. The famous judgment on the German Reinheitsgebot45 is a second 
case in point. The Court there attached particular importance to the fact that 
Germany permitted the use of the additive in question in virtually all beverages 
with the exception of beer. To interpret the proportionality principle as 
prohibiting a general ban for beer is to require Germany to adopt a regulatory 
approach which is in line with that of the Community.46 The Community now
4> At 3906.
42 At 3905; cf. Case 174/82 Sandoz [1983] 2445.
43 Case 188/84 Woodworking Machines [1986] ECR 419.
44 Para. 16.
45 Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227.
46 Namely, the shift away from regulating the composition of specific foodstuffs in favour 



























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
favours ‘horizontal’ regulations, which deal with additives as such and no 
longer prescribe the composition of particular foodstuffs. Within this approach 
it is perfectly reasonable to provide for procedures which enable traders to 
apply for an authorization.47 At the same time, this regulatory technique does 
not preclude Member States from pursuing policies aiming at a high level of 
protection. But such policies are to adhere to a regulatory scheme which ensures 
some consistency in risk policies.
It does not seem easy to reconcile the holdings on French woodworking 
machines and German beer. As both cases show, it is one thing to require 
Member States to take account of the findings of scientific institutions and quite 
another to ensure the equivalence of regulatory philosophies. We will have to 
return later to these limits of the Court’s interference with the regulatory 
autonomy of Member States.48 One interim conclusion can, however, be drawn 
at this point. The ECJ’s references to the normative importance of scientific 
evidence can neither be attributed exclusively to the Community nor to national 
legal systems. Both the Community and the Member States play important roles 
in authorizing risk policies. But the interaction between them is infiltrated by 
trends and actors outside their boundaries. Policy trends promoted by states 
inside and outside the Community, standards of scientific expertise formulated 
by international organizations, or even the prevailing view within the 
international scientific community may enjoy normative validity. Member 
States are requested to design their legislation in a way that enables integration 
of scientific findings and they are bound to give credit to scientific analyses 
undertaken beyond their territories.
2.1.5. Instrumentalizing the Commission’s Powers under Article 100a (4)
The legal relevance of transnational science and infranational policy 
communities has been confirmed by the Court’s handling of the only 
controversy to date that has been fought out under Article 100a (4).49 The 
history of this controversy is complicated but sufficiently well-known. At issue 
was the compatibility of the German prohibition of pentachlorophenol (PCP),
foodstuffs sector; cf. the Commission’s Communication COM (85) 603 final o f 8 November 
1985.
47 Cf. case 178/84 Reinheitsgebot at 1274 and case 304/84 Muller [1986] ECR 1511 (again 
the Court cites a precedent which does not really contain the position the Court is attributing 
to it.)
48 Infra 2.2.2. and 3.2.





























































































which was stricter than the pertinent Community Directive 91/173/EEC adopted 
by qualified majority on 21 March 1991 against Germany’s vote.50 The 
Commission had explicitly endorsed Germany’s position -  and France 
complained. This is how the controversy over Germany’s legislation muted into 
a legal controversy between the Commission and France. The ECJ used the 
opportunity to teach the Commission a lesson and to upgrade its position at the 
same time.
The Court achieved this result by first attributing a constitutive 
importance51 to the supervision of unilateral action taken by Member States 
under Article 100a (4) to which it could therefore apply the requirements of 
Article 190. By doing so, the Court shifted the burden of providing good 
reasons for Germany’s legislation to the Commission.52 This then led the 
Commission to consult a scientist of international standing, Professor Rappe 
from the University of Umea, Sweden. In its decision of 14 September 199453, 
the Commission was able to explain in detail why it considered Germany’s 
position to be justified and announced that it would re-examine the adequacy of 
the Community Directive on the basis of further research it had commissioned. 
It is important to note that Sweden, at the time of the proceedings, had not yet 
joined the Community. This aspect of the controversy only underlines what is 
already obvious: the validity of scientific findings cannot depend on the 
boundary of the legal system which integrates these findings into its laws.
2.2. The Defence of Community Competencies
The ECJ is famous (in the sense of fameux) for rarely questioning the 
Community’s own competencies vis-à-vis the Member States. Significantly 
enough, conflicts over the Community’s regulatory competencies have come up 
in a field where the Community is acting on the basis of majority decisions, 
namely in the field of agricultural policy. Majority voting at Community level 
tends to favour ‘positive’ integration, i.e. the adoption of measures which aim at 
the imposition of a regulatory framework on the functioning of the Internal 
Market. The questioning of the Community’s competence then typically serves 
as a means to restore the veto power which the unanimity rule once implied.
50 Cf. OJ 1991 L 85, 34.
51 Cf. on this point Advocate General Tesauro at 1836.
52 Cf. 1849-1850.




























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
The ECJ’s tendency to defend the Community’s regulatory powers thus 
supports ‘market building through positive regulation’. This is typically 
achieved by adherence to the stricter standards at Community level. Where 
uniform standards cannot be realized, a favouring of high standards may at least 
pave the way for future legislation.
2.2.1. Article 43, EC Protectionism and the Politicization o f Social Regulation
Real world conflicts, however, are usually more complex. They do not simply 
involve the dichotomy between the free market and social regulation, but 
simultaneously concern more trivial policy objectives. A case of exemplary 
importance may suffice to illustrate this point.54
Through Directive 85/649/EEC of 31 December 198555, adopted by a 
qualified majority on the basis of Article 43, the EC prohibited the use of 
hormones in livestock farming. The effect of this policy was to prevent the 
import of American products into the Community. The legal controversy within 
the Community over the policy did not address this trade issue directly. It was 
rather concerned with the regulatory contents of Community law. Even the 
questioning of Community competencies played but a minor role. The argument 
brought forward by the United Kingdom was that, in view of its health 
objectives, Directive 85/649/EEC should have been based upon Article 100. 
That provision requires unanimity. It would thus have enabled the United 
Kingdom to veto the Community prohibition. The Court response to this 
challenge was unambiguous: ‘Efforts to achieve the objectives of the common 
agricultural policy (...) cannot disregard requirements relating to the public 
interest such as the protection of consumers or the protection of health and life 
of humans and animals (...)’.56 The all-encompassing ‘nature’ of the Treaty 
provisions on agricultural policy thus served as a means to justify a ‘positive’ 
measure and to refute the questioning of its legal basis.57
A further complaint by the United Kingdom related to the failure of the 
statement of reasons in the Directive to take into consideration a scientific 
report which had been prepared in accordance with Article 8 of Directive 
81/602/EEC on the prohibition of ‘certain substances having a hormonal action
54 Case 68/86 United Kingdom v Council [1988] ECR 855.
55 OJ 1985 L 382, 228.
56 At 896 (para. 12).






























































































and of any substances having a thyrostatic action’.58 Again, the Court rejected 
that complaint somewhat bluntly: the said Article ‘imposed an obligation on the 
Commission only. (...) Consequently, the Council was not under an obligation 
to refer to those antecedents’.59 This answer is unsatisfactory because the 
complainants had based their argument on the principle of proportionality 
which the Court imported into Community law and explicitly interpreted as 
requiring national legislation to take scientific findings into account.60
This inconsistency appears less surprising, and at the same time more 
interesting, if one considers the sensitivity of the issues involved. The scientific 
report on the risks of hormone use, commissioned in accordance with Directive 
81/602./EEC, had led the Commission to reconsider the strict prohibition of 
Community law.61 Its announcement of a policy change then met with strong 
opposition from both the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC)62 and the 
European Parliament.63 Following the European Parliament’s resolution, the 
Commission cancelled further meetings of the scientific group entrusted with 
the examination of reports the Commission had received. Political opposition to 
the Commission’s readiness to reconsider the Community’s hormones policy 
was thus translated into giving reference to the ‘interests of consumers in 
general (since it could be seen that meat from animals treated with hormones is 
widely rejected)’.64 This type of consumer protection cannot, and need not be, 
supported by scientific evidence. Once its legitimacy as an objective of 
agricultural policy in general and the hormones directive in particular is 
accepted, there is ‘really no reason to examine the health problem (...) and so 
the fact that in the preamble to the contested directive the Council did not go
58 OJ 1981 L 222, 32.
59 At 900 (para. 35).
60 Cf. Supra 2.1.2.; in the follow-up case Fedesa and Others (supra note 57), the 
competence issue was similarly overlaid by arguments on the justification and reasonableness 
of Community law. In its response to the complaint that the Community had infringed 
‘legitimate expectations of traders’ that hormones ‘would not be prohibited in the absence of 
any objectively based doubt’, the Court repeated the arguments it uses when dealing with 
national legislation (cf. 2.1.2.); ‘it need merely be stated that, faced with divergent appraisals 
by the national authorities of the Member States (...) the Council remained within the limits of 
its discretionary power (...), and respond in that way to the concerns expressed by the 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and by several consumer 
organisations’ (at 4061-62).
61 Cf. the Report of the Hearing at 856.
62 OJ 1985 C 44, 14.
63 OJ 1985 C 288, 158.




























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
into the partial findings of the scientific group (...) certainly cannot be regarded 
as a failure to state reasons’.65
This is a serious observation with ironic legal consequences. European 
opposition to the use of hormones in livestock farming creates a broad collision 
of interest groups and public anxieties. Only the latter, however, is classified as 
a problem of social acceptability by experts of risk assessment. The ironic 
consequence of the Court’s reasoning was that it excluded those political actors 
who could claim to represent the European public from articulating that 
concern. It is even more ironic that, had the Court given in to the arguments 
brought forward against the use of Article 43, it would actually have rendered 
those political actors helpless. Assuming the ECJ has given thought to all this, 
its judgment can be understood as supporting the political alliance between the 
majority of Member States and Europe’s political institutions against the veto 
powers of the United Kingdom implied in the unanimity rule of Article 100. 
Nevertheless, the disregard of scientific evidence that the Commission had been 
prepared to bring to bear can hardly be heralded as a triumph of legitimate 
political authority over the neglect of public anxieties by insulated technocrats. 
The institutional mechanism actually endorsed by the Court was the bargaining 
process within the Council. Intergovernmental bargaining should not be equated 
with deliberative political processes on the social acceptability of technological 
developments.
2.2.2. The Scope o f  Secondary Law and Incomplete Harmonization
Once the Community has, through harmonization, ‘occupied’ a field of 
secondary legislation, the supremacy of European law in tandem with the 
principle of pre-emption are said in principle to exclude Member States from 
taking unilateral measures. Doctrinal statements of the said principles tend to 
convey simplistic messages.66 One problem that the ECJ needs to address when 
determining the impact of Community legislation is the delimitation of 
harmonized and non-harmonized fields; i.e. the delimitation of Community 
from national competencies. The definition of medicinal products provides a 
particularly interesting example.
65 Advocate General Lenz at 882.






























































































In three cases dealing with Directive 65/65/EEC concerning proprietary 
medicinal products67 the Court was faced with complaints alleging that Member 
States had unjustly classified products as medicines, thereby preventing their 
unauthorized marketing. Van Bennekom68 concerned vitamins which the 
importer into the Netherlands regarded as foodstuffs69; in Upjohn v Farzoo70 
the parties litigated over the classification of a hair-restoring product as a 
cosmetic or medicinal product; Case C-290/9071 involved a French eye lotion 
which Germany treated as a medicine. In all of these cases, the Court voted in 
favour of the stricter law. These holdings are remarkable because the Court’s 
directions in terms of defining the concepts of medicinal products were not 
sufficient to achieve the Community’s free-trade objective. In Van Bennekom, 
the Court construed Directive 65/65/EEC as covering products presented to and 
used by consumers as medicines; but it then referred to the uncertainties in 
assessing vitamin consumption and underlined the authority of Member States 
to determine for themselves to what risks they were prepared to expose 
consumers72. In Upjohn, the Court’s broad interpretation of Directive 
65/65/EEC was supported by all the intervening Member States; but at least in 
theory market integration could equally have been achieved under the 
Community legislation on cosmetics.73 In the case on eye lotions, the Court 
again underlined the competence of national authorities to determine whether a 
particular product constitutes a medicinal product and then pointed to the 
conformity of Germany’s practice with the views of the Council of Europe’s 
European Pharmacopoeia Commission.74
What all of these cases demonstrate is the inherent weakness of 
harmonization policies which remain restricted to the adoption of common rules 
but fail to provide for the unification of their application.75 Even the Court’s 
insistence on its prerogatives in interpreting Community concepts proves to be 
an insufficient means to achieve the objectives of market integration. All the 
Court is able to do under such circumstances is to invoke the authority of
67 OJ (English Special Edition) 1965-1966,20.
68 Case 227/82 Leendert van Bennekom [1983] ECR 3883.
69 Cf. Case 174/82 Officier vanJustitie v. Sandoz [1983] ECR 2445.
70 Case C-l 12/89 Upjohn v Farzoo and Kortmann [1991] ECR 1-1703.
71 Case C-290/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR 1-3317.
72 Case 227/82 Leendert van Bennekom [1983] ECR at 3901, 3902, 3905.
73 Cf. para. 26 of the opinion delivered by Advocate General Lenz.
74 Case C-290/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-at 3347.




























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
scientific expertise as a yardstick for the assessment of both the reasonableness 
of national practices and the justification for Community intervention.76
2.2.3 Inter-institutional Conflicts
More recently, controversies concerning the proper bases for Community 
legislation have often been initiated by the European Parliament77; 
understandably so, if and because the legal bases for Community legislation 
determine the rights of the European Parliament in the legislative process. This 
type of institutional conflict between the European Parliament and the Council 
is not directly concerned with the mediating role of scientific expertise. This 
holds equally true for the Parliament’s crusade against the delegation of 
regulatory tasks to the Commission under Article 145 and the comitology 
procedure78 or its ongoing efforts to reduce the scope of Council regulations 
based on Article 43.79 These conflicts are truly constitutional in that they 
concern rights of participation in legislative procedures and the potential role of 
the European Parliament in the implementation of Community legislation.
The relation of these institutional controversies to the role of science in 
Community law is only indirect, but still illuminating enough. Involvement of 
the European Parliament in the Community’s legislative or administrative 
activities weakens the autonomy of the compound of Community and national 
administrations. At the same time, it challenges the functioning of the networks 
of experts managing risk regulation in Europe. One has, of course, to ask further 
whether the involvement of Parliament actually leads to a ‘constructive’ 
politicization of risk assessments. One must wonder whether the Parliament’s 
protest against its exclusion from the implementation of legislation adopted 
under the procedures of Articles 189b or 189c is already backed by a 
convincing concept of parliamentary control of the Community’s executive 
law-making.
76 Cf. Advocate General van Gerven’s opinion in Case C-290/90 Commission v Germany 
[1992] ECR I-at 3335: ‘If the Commission wishes to contest the data furnished by the 
Member State, it must do so on the basis of equally reliable data’.
77 Cf. for a recent summary of the Court’s jurisprudence, J. Falke and Ch. Joerges, 
‘Rechtliche Moglichkeiten und Problème bei der Verfolgung und Sicherung nationaler und 
EG-weiter Umweltschutzziele im Rahmen der europâischen Normung’, Gutachten erstellt im 
Auftrag des Büros fur Technikfolgen-Abschâtzung des Deutschen Bundestages, Bremen 
1995.
78 Cf. Crams, H.A., ‘Komitologie im Gesetzgebungsprozess der Europâischen Union und 
die Einbeziehung des Europâischen Parlaments’ (1995) Kritische Justiz 112-131





























































































Before exploring these issues further, a second interim conclusion may be 
drawn. The controversies over the Community’s competencies offer only very 
limited opportunities for questioning or defending the reasonableness of the 
Community’s regulatory policies. Legal guarantees promoting such objectives 
have to be detected elsewhere. In the end, it will turn out that scientific 
expertise and its transnational status is to fulfil important functions in the 
juridification process.
2.3. The Community’s Commitments in the Exercise of its Law-making 
Functions
The Community’s commitments in the exercise of its powers stem from many 
sources. It makes some, albeit limited, sense to organize these sources in 
analogy to conventional hierarchy models of legal systems. Constitutional 
elements of the European legal system which rank high in their validity claims, 
such as human rights and the principle of proportionality, have only been 
introduced by the ECJ. Community primary law itself has undergone changes 
which are of fundamental importance in the present context. The jurisprudence 
of the ECJ spells out principles in practically marginal cases, which may turn 
out to be significant for the whole of Community law. And most importantly, 
the dynamics of the integration process further the emergence of unforeseen 
practices which then require normative ingenuity. All of these preliminary 
remarks serve to underline the infant state of European law and the need to 
exercise great caution in its interpretation.
2.3.1. Recent Developments in Primary Law
It still makes sense to start with provisions of the Treaty in pertinent policy 
fields. Thus Article 130r (3) explicitly requires that available scientific and 
technical data be taken into account in the Community’s environmental policy. 
Article 130 (2) introduced the principle o f ‘precaution’, which by its very nature 
presupposes that public authorities be open to scientific evaluations of risks to 
the environment; one may conclude that this principle should a fortiori be 
applicable to the protection of human health. The legal obligations that follow 
from these provisions still seem to be insufficiently explored.
Just because the ECJ has so far had very limited opportunities to consider 
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should be mentioned80 which primarily concerned the pre-emptive effects of 
Directives 74/442/EEC and 84/631/EEC concerning waste81 and the 
compatibility with Articles 30 and 36 of a Wallonian regulation prohibiting the 
import of waste. This issue concerned the tensions between two Community 
objectives; namely, the prohibition of discriminatory restrictions of trade on the 
one hand and the principle contained in Article 130r (2) that impairments to the 
environment should be remedied at their origin. The Court’s readiness to give 
priority to environmental policy relates first of all to the Community itself. But 
it indirectly affects Member States because they are bound to adopt the 
Community’s environmental policy in order to ensure the effectiveness of their 
legislation.82 The Court’s holding does not concern the integration of scientific 
expertise into the legal system. But it is a further illustration of the merging of 
two levels of governance; the Community system determines the design of 
national environmental policies and in that sense deploys a rationalizing 
effect.83
Because of their tendency to alienate legal systems from their cultural 
background and historical ties, rationalization processes not only improve the 
conditions for a ‘denationalized’ discussion of regulatory issues but also pave 
the way for resorting to scientific expertise as a regulatory tool. This 
interdependence can be illustrated by the recent Angelopharm judgment.84 The 
proceeding started with the German producer of Sedaterm, a substance designed 
to prevent genetically-conditioned hair loss, opposing the prohibition of the 
marketing of his product which had been based on a German Verordnung 
implementing a Commission directive.85 The complainant argued that Sedaterm 
was not injurious to human health and the Verwaltungsgericht Hamburg, having 
commissioned an expert’s opinion from Professor Braun, was prepared to 
invalidate the German prohibition. However it felt unable to do so because the 
Verordnung was implementing Community law.
80 Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR1-4431.
81 Directive 75/442/EEC on waste, OJ 1975 L 194, 47 and Directive 84/631/EEC on the 
supervision and control within the European Community of the transfrontier shipment of 
hazardous waste, OJ 1984 L 326, 31, as amended by Directive 87/112 EEC, OJ 1987 L 48, 
31.
82 Cf. para. 34.
83 Cf. supra 2.1.3.
84 Case C-212/91 Angelopharm GmbH v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [1993] ECR I- 
171.





























































































The ECJ, to which the case was referred, did not answer that question 
directly but addressed a logical precondition for the validity of the Sedaterm 
prohibition -  namely the validity of the Commission directive that Germany 
had so faithfully implemented. The yardstick against which the ECJ then 
measured Community law is difficult to decipher. Having considered the not so 
ambiguous wording of the Cosmetics Directive which vests the Commission 
with the power to issue implementing directives86, the Court stated: ‘The 
drafting and adaptation of Community rules governing cosmetic products are 
founded on scientific and technical assessments which must themselves be 
based on the results of the latest international research (...)’.87 To adopt this 
standard amounts to unauthorizing two Community institutions; neither the 
Commission nor the ‘Committee on the Adaptation to Technical Progress of the 
Directives on the Removal of Technical Barriers to Trade in the Cosmetic 
Products Sector which consists exclusively of representatives of the Member 
States is in a position to carry out the type of assessment which, ‘in the nature 
of things and apart from any provision laid down to that effect’ requires the 
assistance of ‘experts on scientific and technical issues delegated by the 
Member States’.88
‘The nature of things’ is by its very nature a meta-positive principle. It is 
designed to promote the adequacy of regulatory policies by ensuring that they 
take the ‘latest international research’ into account. This type of guarantee is 
neither dependent upon an interference with individual rights; nor is it to be 
inferred from the requirements of Article 190 or shifting the burden of proof to 
this or that actor. All of these well-established legal techniques had been 
considered in the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs.89 The Court was equally 
free to refer to its jurisprudence on the concept of medicinal products and, 
following the precedent of Upjohn v Farzoo90, to classify Sedaterm as a medical 
product and then leave its assessment to the German authorities. The very fact 
that these alternatives were not chosen constitutes the importance of the Court’s 
step towards a further rationalization of regulatory policies in Angelopharm. To 
be sure, the conditions which are to trigger off the obligation to consult science
86 Article 8(2) reads: ‘The amendments necessary for adopting Annexes II to VII to 
technical progress shall be adopted in accordance with the same procedure [laid down in 
Article 10] after consultation of the Scientific Committee for Cosmetology at the initiative of 
the Commission or a Member State.’
87 Case C-212/91 at 210.
88 At 211 (para. 33).
89 At, 190-192.
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need to be specified further and rules governing the selection of experts and the 
structuring of their deliberations will have to be developed. Follow-up problems 
of this kind are, however, inevitable wherever a re-conceptualization of legal 
approaches is initiated.91
2.3.2. Towards Differentiated Standards o f  Judicial Review under Article 190
One obvious candidate for the further juridification of the Community’s 
regulatory practices, which has already been addressed in the context of 
controversies on Community competencies92, is the statement-of-reasons 
requirement of Article 190. This provision seems to have the potential to 
structure legal reactions according to the complexities of European legislation 
and decision-making. Significantly enough, the initiators of pertinent 
proceedings tend to invoke Article 190 as an additional basis for their 
dissatisfaction with the Community’s regulatory practices. This holds true for 
both the efforts of the European Parliament to defend or broaden its rights of 
participation93 and for complaints concerning the proper basis of Community 
measures.94
The Court has adopted a differentiating approach. The Council tends to 
be treated as a regular legislator, enjoying wide margins of discretion.95 The 
Commission, however, has been controlled more strictly. As has already been 
observed96, the readiness of the Court to rigidly interpret the statement-of- 
reasons requirement where controversial assessments of risks are at stake 
indirectly imposes equivalent obligations on national legislators, who are 
thereby placed on the same footing as the Community executive.
A further step has been taken in relation to decisions concerning 
individual rights of direct action. The statement of reasons required by Article 
190 ‘must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by 
the Community authority (...) in such a way as to make the persons concerned 
aware of the reasons for the measure and thus enable them to defend their rights 
and to enable the court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction’. This is the
91 It should be pointed out that the Community can build upon its well-established 
practices of nominating members of its scientific committees and their procedures.
92 Cf. 2.2.1. supra.
93 Cf. 2.2.3. supra.
94 Cf. 2.2.2. supra.
95 Cf., for instance, Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others, supra note 57, at 4063.





























































































Court’s own restatement of its prior jurisprudence in Hauptzollamt Munchen- 
Mitte v Technische Universitdt Miinchen.91 It sounds somewhat brightening.97 8 
And yet in the TU Miinchen case, the rejected formula led the Court to annul the 
decision in question.
The importance of this decision results from its concurrent recognition of 
basic procedural rights: where Community institutions have the power to carry 
out complex technical appraisals, respect for the rights of individuals is to be 
ensured by the ‘duty of the competent Community institutions to examine 
carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case, the 
rights of the persons concerned to make their views known and to have an 
adequately reasoned decision’.99
2.3.3. Testing Regulatory Reasonableness and the Principle o f Proportionality
It seems fair to assume that the obligations imposed by the Community on 
Member States in the exercise of their legislative competencies must equally be 
respected by itself. Such equations will of course have to cautiously consider 
whether the Court’s jurisprudence contains normative elements of general 
application or must be understood as a means to overcome legal barriers to 
market integration. Any conclusion based on the ECJ’s resort to scientific 
expertise in the supervision of national legislation under Articles 30 and 36 will 
have to be prepared to differentiate between the need to establish a Community­
wide reference framework for the assessment of regulatory policies and the use 
of the principle of proportionality as a normative yardstick of general validity 
for the balancing of regulatory concerns and private rights. Such caution is 
prompted by the interpretation of the Community’s powers as originating from 
transfers of competencies originally vested with nation-states. The ‘transferor’ 
is supposed to respect the position obtained by the ‘transferee’. Accordingly, 
one must not readily infer from the obligation of Member States to take 
Community objectives into account when pursuing their own regulatory 
concerns that an equivalent restriction holds in relation to the Community’s 
own legislative discretion.
The Court has been very reluctant indeed to question the wisdom of any 
measures approved by the Council. Thus, in Fedesa and Others, the Court
97 Case C-269/90, [1991] ECR 1-5469 at 5499.
98 Cf. the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs at 5492-93.





























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
limited its review of the discretionary power conferred on the Council in the 
implementation of the common agricultural policy to ‘examine whether the 
measure in question is vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of powers, or 
whether the authority in question has manifestly exceeded the limits of its 
discretion.’100 This broad discretion is to shrink where measures are taken by 
the Commission acting alone or with one of its committees. In the above- 
mentioned TU München case the Court’s quest for a substantiated statement of 
reasons implies that Community institutions are to base their decisions on a 
careful and impartial examination of all the aspects of the case.101 Similarly, the 
Court’s questioning of the capacity of the Commission and its Regulatory 
Committee to assess the risk of Sedaterm102 restricts its discretionary power 
quite drastically. Last but not least, the Commission’s (newly acquired) powers 
under the procedure of Article 100a (4) are severely limited by the Court’s 
request for a qualified examination of national measures.103
All of these requirements do not merely concern the Commission and its 
Advisory, Administrative and Regulatory Committees. They relate to the legal 
system as such, and even challenge the authority of the ECJ. The Court’s 
twofold objective of promoting the technical and scientific sophistication of 
regulatory decision-making while at the same time preserving its own 
supervisory powers and ensuring the protection of individual rights necessitates 
the development of a new body of rules and principles capable of bridging the 
gap between law and science. This is, however, by no means an unprecedented 
challenge.
2.3.4. Proceduralization o f  Legal Controls
The search for legal guarantees for the substantive adequacy of regulatory 
decisions and their fairness to individuals concerned has only been taken on 
occasionally and in quite different settings. One group of cases which has not 
yet been referred to is the judicial review of refusals of the Commission to 
recruit applicants on grounds of physical unfitness. Such decisions are taken on 
the basis of Staff Regulations which foresee an appraisal of the candidate’s 
health by a medical committee. Review of such appraisals is limited to 
questions of the committee’s constitution and its proper proceedings. But the
100 Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others, supra note 57, at 4061 ; cf. 2.2.1. supra.
101 Case C- C-269/90 Hauptzollamt München-Mitte v Technische Universitat München 
[1991] ECR 1-5469 at 5499 (para. 14).
102 Cf. supra 2.3.1.





























































































Court has made it clear that judicial restraint is dependent upon the 
appropriateness of the complaints procedure as well as the objectivity of the 
committee’s investigations.104
Much more directly in point is once again the Court’s case-law on the 
decisional practices concerning the importation of Community Customs Tariff 
duties on scientific and other materials under Council Regulation 1789/75.105 
According to the procedure laid down in Regulation 2784/79106, the 
Commission is to consult Member States and, if necessary, a group of experts 
comprising representatives of Member States. As to the practices of this group. 
Advocate General Jacobs observed that its composition of officials from the 
Ministries of Finance or Trade may render it ‘unduly sensitive to the interests of 
manufacturers in their respective countries’.107 Indeed, the group’s refusal to 
accept the request of the TU Miinchen for the free importation of a microscope 
from Japan on the ground that an instrument of equivalent scientific value was 
available in the Community coincided all too obviously with the views of 
Philips submitted at each stage of the proceedings. This striking coincidence 
then led the Court to point out that the expert committee on which the 
Commission is to rely must be ‘composed of persons possessing the necessary 
knowledge in the various fields concerned’108; furthermore, ‘the person 
concerned should be able, during the actual proceedings before the 
Commission, to put his own case and properly make his views known on the 
relevant circumstances, and, where necessary, on the documents taken into 
account by the Community institutions’.109
Even easy cases can make good law. Integration of experts into the 
Community’s regulatory decisions amounts to a delegation of legal 
responsibilities which needs to be compensated by adequate procedural 
safeguards. This message of the TU Miinchen case was even more clearly 
articulated in a different field of Community law, namely the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the compatibility of self-regulatory practices with the 
competition rules of the Treaty and the duties of Member States under Article
104 Case 156/80 Mobelli [1981] ECR 1357 at para. 19; Case 265/83 Suss v Commission 
[1984] ECR 4029 at para. 11; cf. more recently Case T-10/93 A v Commission [1994] ECR II- 
179 (refusal to accept a HIV-positive candidate).
105 OJ 1975 L 184, 1; amended by Regulation 1027/79, OJ 1979 L 134, 1.
106 OJ 1979 L 318, 32.
107 At 5490.
108 At 5550 (para. 22).




























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
5.110 The most interesting case in the present context concerns a German self- 
regulatory commission of experts from the transport sector entrusted by the 
Ministry of Transport with the task of fixing freight rates.111 The Court 
accepted this type of supervised self-regulation assuming, however, that
-  the commission was bound to respect the public interest in providing 
encompassing services;
-  its composition corresponded to all the interests involved;
-  the expert members did not pursue the interests of their undertakings;
-  and the Ministry was represented at commission meetings and in a position 
to eventually reject commission proposals.
Apart from second-guessing as to whether the ECJ actually applied the 
principles it pronounced to the case at hand, one must ask whether the restraints 
imposed on economic self-regulation are exclusively designed to structure 
vertical relations between the Community and Member States. The better 
reasons militate in favour of a broader interpretation. Not only do Member 
States need to respect the regulatory objectives of free competition, but the 
Community itself needs to balance its twofold commitment to a system of 
undistorted competition and regulatory objectives explicitly laid down in the 
Treaty. The criteria developed by the Court for its supervision of economic self­
regulation at national level provide guidance for exactly that task. They are 
particularly suited to structuring the participation of non-governmental bodies, 
such as the European standardization organizations, in concretizing legislatively 
defined essential safety requirements.
Administrative law in bits and pieces, one may conclude. But it seems 
possible to fit the puzzling and scattered evidence into a quite coherent picture. 
The Commission is bound to resort to scientific advice where the ‘nature of 
things’ so requires. The expertise it is supposed to take into account must be 
objective, impartial and of high calibre. All of these requirements have an 
impact on the composition of expert committees and on the procedures of risk 
assessments and management. Interested persons and institutions must have
110 On the following cf. for a more detailed analysis, in J. Falke and Ch. Joerges, 
‘Rechtliche Môglichkeiten und Problème bei der Verfolgung und Sicherung nationaler und 
EG-weiter Umweltschutzziele im Rahmen der europâischen Normung’, Gutachten erstellt im 
Auftrag des Büros für Technikfolgen-Abschâtzung des Deutschen Bundestages, Bremen 1995 
at 147 ff.





























































































access to files and be in a position to state their views. Compliance with all of 
these criteria is subject to judicial review. The picture, however, is still 
incomplete. One of its most irritating facets should now be further examined.
3. Governance Beyond the State: Some Tentative Deliberations
The normative problematic of the legal developments we have described so far 
can only be fully understood when they are analysed within the broader 
framework of Europe’s institutional structures and the regulatory challenges 
posed by the integration process. This concluding section will therefore return 
to the theses and queries submitted at the beginning of the paper.112 It will first 
summarize the findings on the ECJ’s resort to the authority of science as a 
means of both overcoming the territorial boundaries of legal systems and 
improving the quality of regulatory decision-making. It will then point to the 
practical limits of these judicial strategies and finally address the core 
normative problem of the emerging European governance structures.
3.1. The Autonomy of Science and the Authority of Expert Communities
As has become apparent when considering the jurisprudence of the ECJ on the 
compatibility of national regulations with Community law, the Court’s quest for 
‘objectivity’ and ‘proportionality’ amounts to an assignment of regulatory 
authority to scientific communities.113 We have then observed how the Court 
tends to subject Community institutions to equivalent obligations. Even when 
reviewing decisions taken by the Council, the ECJ has examined their 
compatibility with the majority view among national authorities.114 Both the 
PCP and the Angelopharm judgments strengthened this tendency considerably. 
When interpreted as laying down a principle of general validity, the holding in 
PCP requires the Community to base its control of national policies on 
scientific evidence of international standing.115 Similarly, the judgment in
u2 Supra 1.3.
113 Cf. supra 2.1.1. and 2.1.4.
114 Cf. Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others, supra note 57, at 4061.




























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
Angelopharm forces the Commission, and implicitly the Community legislator, 
to seek scientific advice wherever the ‘nature of things’ so requires.116
The meta-legal authority of science can equally be identified as a basis 
for the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the inter-state recognition of scientific appraisals 
and the opening up of national authorization procedures to foreign applications. 
These obligations are supported by Article 5 of the Treaty and are designed to 
implement the Community concept of mutual recognition, which in turn is to 
overcome the traditional conceptual limits of international administrative law. 
But the kind of obligation the ECJ has brought to bear refers once again to non- 
legal authorities. This becomes particularly clear when the Court accepts 
national regulatory autonomy in situations of scientific uncertainties and, at the 
same time, restricts that autonomy by invoking the state of international 
research.117 It becomes equally apparent when national authorities are requested 
to make use of scientific analyses carried out in other Member States in their 
authorization procedures.118
One must certainly not assume that the ECJ is so naive as to believe in an 
unquestionable validity of expertise or in a clear demarcation line between 
‘certainty’ and ‘uncertainty’ in science-based assessments. The scientific 
authority to which the Court refers is none other than a social construct. But the 
Court has not only indicated which scientific institutions and communities can 
claim authority, it has also addressed the needs and constraints of transforming 
scientific findings into risk-management policies. Pertinent case-law is 
abundant. The Court has been forced to consider linguistic problems and 
communication difficulties of German administrators119; the appropriateness of 
a Belgian nomination of the director of a water-purifying company as the 
competent authority to issue permits120; the Greek certificates for pasteurised 
butter121; and countless similar issues.122
110 Supra 2.3.1.
117 Cf. supra 2.1.1. and as an additional example Case 54/85 Mirepoix [1986] ECR 1067 at 
1079: ‘National authorities are obliged to review the prohibition of a pesticide (...) it appears 
to them that the reasons which led to the adoption of such measures have changed, for 
example, as a result of the discovery of a new use for a particular pesticide, or as a result of 
further information becoming available through scientific research’.
118 Case 272/80 Biologische Producten [1981] 3277 at 3292; cf. 2.1.2. supra.
119 Case C-243/81 Commission v Germany [1984] ECR 1111.
120 Case C-372-374/85 Ministère publique v. Traen [1987] ECR 2141.






























































































The Court’s entanglement in such a morass follows a compelling logic. Once 
the authority of science in risk assessments is established, the guidelines of risk- 
management practices must equally adhere to non-national standards. This 
logic, however, comes at a price. Cases on the compatibility of national risk- 
management practices are responses of the legal system to highly specific 
constellations. Judicial review is, of course, meant to resolve such matters. It 
may even detect and pronounce principles of general validity. But it is not 
capable of coherently building up the kind of infrastructures transnational risk- 
management practices require. Similar difficulties have been identified in the 
case-law on Directive 65/65/EEC.12 23 Any European prerogative in determining 
the meaning of legal concepts, such as ‘medicinal products’, remains an 
insufficient means of achieving the free-trade objective, unless the Community 
ensures that the indispensable determination of normative requirements is 
supported by a Europeanization of implementation practices. The 
infrastructures which such backing presupposes cannot be imposed through 
Community legislation. It is even less conceivable that they be created through 
judicial review.
Where the judicial branch pronounces principles which tend to 
overburden the infrastructures of the legal system, financial support and 
legislative action become indispensable. And indeed, as has already been 
pointed out124, Community legislation and many accompanying measures are 
responding to these needs. Suffice it here to point again to the omnipresence of 
expert committees in the preparation and implementation of Community 
legislation; the strengthening of the position of scientific committees within the 
Community’s comitology, even prior to the Angelopharm judgment; and the 
furthering of cooperation among national administrative bodies and with non­
governmental organizations. It is by no means clear to what degree the 
normative logic of the ECJ’s jurisprudence, the Community’s legislative 
initiatives as well as the many efforts to ensure the cooperation of national 
administrative bodies and non-governmental organizations have already
122 Cf., for instance, Case C-123/89 United Foods et al v Belgium [1981] ECR 995 (health 
inspection of fish); Case C-124/81 Commission v United Kingdom [1983] ECR 203 (license 
systems of milk inspection); Case 42/82R Commission v France [1982] 841 (customs 
clearance of Italian wine); Case C-426/92 Germany v. Deutsches Milch-Kontor GmbH [1994] 
ECR 2757 (detection of fraudulent practices).
123 Cf. supra 2.2.2.




























































































Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the ECJ
established, or are likely to achieve, the building up of efficient infrastructures 
for denationalized European practices of risk assessment and management. One 
should at any rate be prepared to reckon with one latent difficulty: the need to 
ensure the legitimacy of regulatory decisions affecting the interests of 
enterprises and citizens all over Europe. The practical importance of this 
problem may be difficult to specify. There is nevertheless every reason to 
consider the potential of European law to ensure the normative quality of 
decision-making that European citizens have learned to appreciate within the 
boundaries of their constitutional States.
3.3. The Accountability of Denationalized Governance Structures
Assuming that ‘we the peoples’ of Europe do not want to build up a Federal 
State which would be entrusted with the tasks of social regulation; assuming 
further that Europeans are nevertheless interested in benefiting from an opening 
up of their formerly national economies; assuming, last but not least, that the 
Europeanization of markets requires institutional structures which ensures both 
the effectiveness and the legitimacy of risk assessments, then we are bound to 
strive for institutional solutions which transcend the boundaries of our 
constitutional States without replacing these States with a Europeanized 
equivalent. Social regulation thus provides a case of exemplary importance for 
the normative dilemmas of regulatory politics in transnational contexts: All the 
Member States and (the greater part of) their societies are interested in principle 
in the exchange of products and services; none, however, seems ready to waive 
the type of protection provided by the regulation of risks or to simply leave the 
level of protection to processes of regulatory competition. Even more 
important, each individual society asks for protection against risks originating 
beyond its own polity. And yet, the building up of European political 
institutions and administrative authorities entrusted with supranational 
competencies for all the sensitive issues of social regulation seems neither 
normatively desirable nor practically conceivable.
For the time being, institutional models which would resolve all of these 
difficulties are not readily available. What does seem possible at this stage is to 
summarize guidelines which should be taken into account in the development of 
institutional responses.
-  Denationalized governance structures are to be conceived as





























































































acceptability and legitimacy will depend upon the concomitant 
institutionalization of economic freedoms and public responsibilities.
-  Risk assessment and management policies within European networks 
should to reflect the concerns of European societies; they must mediate 
between the functional needs of efficient decision-making, its public 
transparency and accessibility for administrative and non-governmental 
actors.
-  The legal system must continue its search for guarantees of regulatory 
reasonableness, procedural safeguards and the protection of rights. This 
search should be complemented by the institutionalization of political 
accountability. Such institutional innovations would have to correspond 
to the emerging structures of governance beyond intergovemmentalism 
and below supranationalism. One conceivable step might be the 
entrustment of parliamentary committees, composed of both European 
parliament members and national delegates, with the task of regularly 
reviewing the experiences of Community and national officials, of 
organizing hearings to which experts and non-governmental 
organizations would be invited, and of initiating legislative action at the 
European and national level.
These are but tentative suggestions. And yet the underlying normative vision 
should have become sufficiently clear. In the absence of a uniform European 
society and a European State, the structures of social regulation in Europe must 
resolve the tensions arising from the openness of markets on the one hand and 
the need to respond to ‘legitimate’ regulatory concerns on the other. The search 
to comply with, and mediate between, these two objectives needs to build upon 
their respective normative merits: societies granting freedoms or imposing 
regulatory burdens must consider the adverse extraterritorial effects of their 
policies. This obligation amounts to the granting of a voice to ‘foreign’ citizens 
and their representatives. European law can be interpreted as ensuring exactly 
such rights. In this vision, the quest for ‘regulatory reasonableness’ of national 
measures reflects the respect for concerns which are not represented in internal 
policy processes. Legal constraints imposed by European law to ensure the 
openness not only of markets but also of regulatory decision-making are by no 
means undemocratic; the building up of denationalized governance structures 
should therefore aim at the strengthening of deliberative processes dealing with 
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